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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses social movement theory to describe the formation of street 
gangs and account for their high levels of violence.  By understanding street 
gangs as a social movement contributing to the gang cycle, my hope is that 
communities and law enforcement will be able to adopt better strategies for 
breaking the cycle.  Likewise, the study of street gangs serves as a laboratory for 
counterinsurgency operations overseas.  By understanding the potential effects 
of repression on a population, future counterinsurgent operators will better 
understand the complex environment in which they serve.  As demonstrated by 
the case studies of Salinas and Oakland, continued coercive repression and 
negative channeling are recipes for creating isolation within a community that 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Street gangs, in one form or another, have existed in urban areas of the United 
States for over two hundred years.  Beginning with bands of Irish or Italian 
immigrants in 19th century Manhattan, street gangs have long provided a source 
of structure and identity to people who feel isolated from the broader community.  
Whether the feeling of isolation stems from political, social or economic divisions, 
street gangs often fill the gap between the needs of a particular part of the 
population and the services provided by the community or government. At the 
same time, street gangs propose two serious problems: street gangs often 
account for a majority of the violence in a given community, and street gangs are 
growing, evolving and networking throughout the country bringing increasing 
rates of violence.  As street gangs evolve and grow, they follow a cycle of 
repression, collective identity, and networking that are often associated with high 
levels of violence.  To explain gang violence, social movement theory connects 
the effects of varying levels of repression to the varying levels and sources of 
gang violence present in American society. 
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Street gangs, in one form or another, have existed in urban areas of the 
United States for over two hundred years.  Beginning with bands of Irish or Italian 
immigrants in 19th century Manhattan, street gangs have long provided a source 
of structure and identity to people who feel isolated from the broader community.  
Whether the feeling of isolation stems from political, social or economic divisions, 
street gangs often fill the gap between the needs of a particular part of the 
population and the services provided by the community or government.1 At the 
same time, street gangs propose two serious problems: gangs usually account 
for the majority of violence in a given community, and street gangs are growing, 
evolving and networking throughout the country bringing increasing rates of 
violence.2  As an example, first generation street gangs are characterized as turf 
oriented, locally based, and opportunistic organizations, but many gangs have 
slowly evolved into second and even third generation gangs.3 Second generation 
gangs refer to those that “are organized for business and commercial gain…have 
a more centralized leadership, and members tend to focus on drug trafficking,”4 
while fourth generations gangs “inevitably begin to control ungoverned territory 
within a nation-state and/or begin to acquire political power in poorly-governed 
spaces.”5 As street gangs evolve and grow, they follow a cycle of repression, 
collective identity, and networking that are often associated with high levels of 
violence.  To explain gang violence, social movement theory connects the effects 
of varying levels of repression to the varying levels and sources of gang violence 
present in American society. 
                                            
1 Rick Landre, Mike Miller, and Dee Porter, Gangs: A Handbook for Community Awareness, 
(New York: Facts on File, Inc, 1997), 18. 
2 Sara Miller, “Murder Rates Rising, Cities Respond,” CSMonitor.com, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0811/p01s04-ussc.html?s=widep, (accessed November 19, 
2009). 
3 Max G. Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency,” 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi, (accessed February 25, 2009). 9. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 10. 
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II. THE GANG CYCLE 
A. REPRESSION, GANG FORMATION, AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
When considering street gangs, repression leads to gang violence through 
a self-reinforcing cycle as illustrated in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1.   The Gang Cycle of Violence 
According to the cycle, the continual repression of certain segments of 
society using less visible and illegitimate forms of coercion and channeling has 
created highly isolated segments of society. Over time, these isolated 
communities view outsiders and representatives of government as “as indifferent 
to their welfare and …as agents of repression.”6 As an attempt at self-
governance, street gangs develop in these isolated communities as a way for 
individuals to provide effective security, support, and other “primitive state 
functions,”7 which eventually develops into a strong collective identity centered 
on gang membership. The level to which gangs embrace their collective identity  
 
 
                                            
6 Manwaring, “Street Gangs,” 10. 
7 Stergios Skaperdas, “The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection 
when the State Does Not,”   Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, 
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~sskaperd/SkaperdasEoG01.pdf, (accessed September 9, 2009). 
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is best characterized by the President of the Ventura, California chapter of the 
Hells Angels Motorcycle Club: “We are a society unto ourselves.  We govern 
ourselves.  We discipline ourselves.”8 
B. RESOURCE COMPETITION AND GANG VIOLENCE 
As the collective identity of street gangs supersedes the state, street 
gangs must compete with other gangs for control of the limited resources 
available to the isolated community.  Just as with the nation-state system, 
competition for resources at the street gang level results in increasingly more 
organized forms of violence.  Through the course of violence, street gangs 
further mirror nation-states and develop loose bureaucracies that allow for 
alliances and complex gang networks.  This means that street gangs have 
gained the ability to form “a neural network…a network of cells” resembling a 
starfish.9  Once street gangs combine to form complex social networks, they 
become virtually unstoppable.  The inability of police action to stop street gangs 
then invites further repression from the state, which continues the gang cycle 
indefinitely.   
                                            
8 William Marsden and Julian Sher, Angels of Death: Inside the Bikers’ Global Crime Empire 
(Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 2006), 362. 
9 Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider (New York: The Penguin 
Group, 2006), 35. 
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III. THE TYPOLOGY OF REPRESSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Stemming from America’s dark history of slavery and social equality, the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s demonstrated the state’s ability to use 
repression to “encourage or discourage certain types of actions on the part of 
protestors.”10  As a form of social control, repression may vary from coercion to 
channeling.  Coercive repression refers to the use of intimidation or direct force 
to control the population, while channeling refers to political, social or police 
actions that “affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or 
the flows of resources to movements.”11 As demonstrated by the race riots of the 
60s, excessive coercion can produce dangerous and costly reactions of the 
repressed population, while “channeling as a more indirect repression”12 can 
sometimes yield similar results.   
In addition to coercion and channeling, repression manifests itself in terms 
of varying levels of observation.  The spectrum of the visibility of repression 
“could be placed on a continuum from entirely invisible actors, actions, and 
intentions to entirely visible actors, actions and intentions.”13 As an example, 
police brutality in response to protest is an example of repression that is highly 
observable, where excessive criminal prosecution of members of African 
American communities during the 1986 “crack epidemic” is much less 
observable.14 Each of these repressive measures applies directly to the typology 
of repression concerning street gangs as related to their corresponding levels of 
violence. 
                                            
10 Jennifer Earl, “Repression and the Social Control of Protest,” Mobilization 11(2006), 130. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” 
Sociological Theory 21(2003), 48. 
14 Pamela E. Oliver, “Repression and Crime Control: Why Social Movement Scholars Should 
Pay attention to Mass Incarceration as a Form of Repression,” Mobilization 13(2008), 2. 
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Finally, repression also refers to legitimacy.  According to Hess and 
Martin, “repressive events that are perceived as unjust have the potential to 
generate enormous public outrage against those seen as responsible.”15 This 
means that the social response to repressive measures of the state, even if 
technically “legal,” will vary greatly based on the perceived legitimacy of the 
actions of the repressing agent.  For example, the Rodney King incident of 1991 
demonstrates how police actions can be perceived as illegitimate. Public outrage 
in Los Angeles following the all-white jury’s acquittal of the accused police quickly 
erupted into riots, which resulted in fifty-four deaths and over 7,000 arrests.16 
B. COERCION AND CHANNELING  
As components of repression, coercion and channeling each come in 
distinct varieties.  Coercion, regardless of visibility or legitimacy, can be 
employed by a repressive state either selectively or indiscriminately.  As an 
example, members of a given community governed with good policing practices 
will characterize most policing policies as selective.  This means that only those 
individuals who violate the law face legal punishment.  However, if a given 
community views its policing efforts as indiscriminate, then members of that 
community will perceive most police action as random, undeserved, and 
illegitimate.  In the case of channeling, states can use either positive or negative 
channeling.  Positive channeling involves taking a preventative approach to 
controlling behavior by directing undesired social behavior to more preferred 
activities.  For example, school sponsored sports teams channel the aggressive 
energy of young males away from violence and toward more positive and 
constructive ends.  On the other hand, negative channeling involves controlling 
                                            
15 David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative 
Events,” Mobilization 11(2006), 249. 
16 Doug Linder, “The Trials of Los Angeles Police Officers' in Connection with the Beating of 
Rodney King,” http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/lapd/lapdaccount.html, (accessed 
November 6, 2009). 
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behavior by “regulating key resource controls to movements.”17 As an example of 
negative channeling to prevent “tea party protests” in Florida, “City governments 
all across the country are charging fees for ‘permits,’ forcing organizers to pay 
out huge sums for ‘insurance policies,’ and binding tea party organizers in all 
sorts of government red tape.”18 Instead of prohibiting the protests, the state is 
using negative channeling to prevent these protests from occurring. 
According to Figure 2, selective and indiscriminate coercion types along 
with positive and negative channeling can produce four potential combinations: 
  Coercion 
  Selective  Indiscriminate  
Positive Type A Type B 
Channeling 
Negative Type C Type D 
Figure 2.   Coercion and Channeling 
Type A repression represents the most ideal case as described by the 
above chart.  This type of repression successfully provides members of society 
with opportunities for positive channeling and coercion is only used when 
necessary and only when perceived to be deserved. Type B repression occurs 
when social grievances are positively channeled, but members of society 
perceive use of coercive repression as indiscriminate or illegitimate.  When 
indiscriminate coercion occurs, all members of that society are subject to the 
burden of coercion regardless of their actions.  Type C repression occurs when 
the state only uses coercion selectively, but the presence of negative channeling 
also denies many opportunities for improvement or advancement.  This type of 
repression can yield effective results in the short term but risks the possibility of 
                                            
17 Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” 
Sociological Theory 21(2003), 48. 
18 Warner Todd Huston, “Florida Gov Shut Down Tea Party,” 
http://taxdayteaparty.com/2009/03/florida-gov-shuts-down-tea-party/, (accessed November 6, 
2009). 
 8
future protest of the population’s inability to escape the status quo. Finally, type 4 
repression represents the most oppressive form of repression.  In type D 
repression, not only does negative channeling deny opportunities for 
improvement, but also members of the community perceive the use of coercion 
as equally likely to occur, regardless of their actions.  Without a highly resourced 
regime capable of constant repression, this type of repression is likely to trigger 
public outrage and backfire, especially when the actions of the regime are 
considered illegitimate.  By understanding the expected results of each 
repression type, one can better understand how each type can drive other forms 
of behavior or result in other unintended consequences.  
C.  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VIOLENCE 
As gang violence rises due to the actions of the gang cycle, this violence 
presents itself in two forms: street gangs commit violence either internally against 
rival gangs, or externally against the broad community.  This range of gang 
violence produces four distinct types of violence as illustrated in Figure 3: 
  External Violence: 
Gang Violence against the Community 
  Low High 
Low Type 1 Type 2 Internal Violence: 
Gang Violence 
against other Gangs High Type 3 Type 4 
Figure 3.   Typology of Gang Violence 
Type 1 violence occurs when gang violence against other gangs is low 
and when violence against the broad community is low.  This is the most 
preferred case for controlling gang violence and it is the result of more effective 
counter-gang strategies.  Type 2 violence is characterized by low internal 
violence between rival gangs coupled with high levels of external violence 
directed against the community.  To the community, type 2 violence is nothing 
more than regular community violence, meaning the benchmark level of violence 
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that a given community expects and is accustomed to.  Type 3 violence occurs 
when violence between rival gangs is high, but violence against the community is 
low.  This means that violence is mostly contained within the street gang 
structure and has little effect on the broad community.  Finally, type 4 violence 
occurs when gang violence is high both internally and externally.  This type of 
violence indicates that gang resources are increasingly scarce and violence has 
carried over to the broad community.  
 10
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IV. THE PATHWAY FROM REPRESSION TO GANG VIOLENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand how repression and gang violence are related requires an 
understanding of how the causal mechanisms involved determine exactly how 
each type of repression leads to each particular type of violence.  As previously 
indicated, repression and violence are connected according to four hypotheses:  
Type A repression leads to type 1 violence, type B repression leads to type 3 
violence,  type C repression leads to type 2 violence, and type D repression 
leads to type 4 violence.  However, each of these variables connects through 
three distinct intervening variables following the gang cycle.   
According to the gang cycle, gang formation follows repression.  However, 
as stated by Opp and Roehl, “the effects of repression vary: increased repression 
may promote or impede mobilization processes.”19  This means that repression 
either increases or decreases the mobilization of street gangs depending on how 
the acts of repression elicit social, moral, or public goods incentives.20 As 
previously described in the typology of repression, types A and B repression are 
characterized by positive channeling, which produces fewer incentives to create 
or join gangs, while types C and D repression are characterized by negative 
channeling which does provide such incentives.  Likewise, types A and C 
repression are also characterized by selective repression, while types B and C 
repression are characterized by indiscriminate repression.  The more that 
coercion seems to be selective; the more it will also seem to be legitimate.  This 
means that gangs are less likely to form when repression appears more 
legitimate than when perceived as illegitimate.21 
                                            
19 Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political 
Protest,” Social Forces 69(1990), 521. 
20 Ibid., 525. 
21 Ibid., 526. 
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Following the gang cycle, gang formation leads to increased collective 
identity where gang membership supersedes all other identities. Therefore, as 
gangs develop, the level of collective identity produced by gang members results 
from how gang ideology is ‘framed’ and likewise resonated throughout the 
organization.  According to Snow et al., frames contribute to a movement’s 
identity by “rendering events or occurrences meaningful” that serves “to organize 
experience and guide action.”22 Additionally, frames are “cognitive cues used to 
render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest 
alternative modes of action.”23   
As the collective identity of gang members rises, gangs essentially turn 
their backs on the initial source of repression.  In doing so, gangs begin to 
disassociate themselves with the broad political system and concern themselves 
primarily with procuring needed resources.  This is especially true in second and 
third generation gangs where profit and commercial interests are at stake.24 
When this happens, gangs enter into strict competition with other gangs for 
financial, economic, or social resources that are available at the street level.  As 
this competition for resources increases and becomes a negative sum 
competition, the competition turns into violence. 
In summary, the varying typologies of repression each affect the flow of 
the gang cycle individually and produce unique inputs on each phase of the 
cycle.  By understanding how the intervening variables of mobilization, strategic 
framing and resource competition affect the gang cycle,  provides insight into 
how each of the four hypotheses uniquely translates varying types of repression 
into varying types of violence. 
                                            
22 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological 
Review 51:4(1986): 464. 
23 Doowan Lee, Class Notes, Social Movement Theory, Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 19, 2009. 
24 Max G. Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency,” 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi, (accessed February 25, 2009). 9. 
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B. THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS—BEST CASE 
The first hypothesis that explains the relationship between repression and 
violence is that type A repression leads to type 1 violence. However, as 
previously discussed, each type of repression has three intervening variables 
that produce varying types of violence.  Therefore, to understand the first 
hypothesis requires understanding how repression characterized by positive 
channeling and selective repression affects the mobilization, strategic framing 
and resources according to the gang cycle. 
Of the four hypotheses, the first hypothesis represents the best-case 
scenario for minimizing gang mobilization.  As a combination of both positive 
channeling and selective repression, type A repression is perceived as the most 
legitimate.  This means that the effects of any social or political grievances 
against the state are channeled effectively into positive activity.  Likewise, the 
community also perceives only the use of appropriate and selective coercion by 
police and other authority figures.  This means that community members 
recognize local police activity as necessary and legitimate. 
By minimizing mobilization and gang formation, there are no opportunities 
for gangs to develop strong collective identity.  Without excessive grievances 
leading to gang formation, the gang cycle effectively stops.  If gangs do not exist, 
then they cannot use strategic framing to guide their grievances into “modes of 
action.”25 Likewise, the lack of gang membership and framing eliminates the 
possibility for resource competition that eliminates gang violence and the need 
for continued state repression.  However, the remaining hypotheses produce 
increasing circumstances that are even more difficult. 
C. THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS 
In cases of type B repression, the combination of positive channeling and 
indiscriminate coercion will likely contribute direct inputs to the gang cycle.  
                                            
25 Doowan Lee, Class Notes, Social Movement Theory, Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 19, 2009. 
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Although positive channeling directs some grievances into positive activity, 
indiscriminate coercion in a society that perceives authority as illegitimate is more 
likely to contribute to isolation and gang formation.  As the gang cycle continues, 
type B repression will produce more type 3 gang violence where violence 
between gangs in high, but there is low violence directed against the community.  
This means that instances of gang violence will still occur as gangs compete for 
limited resources within the community, but gangs will not contribute to violence 
against the community due to the existence of positive channeling. 
D. THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS 
In cases of type C repression, the combination of negative channeling and 
selective repression will also contribute to gang formation that follows the gang 
cycle toward violence.  However, the existence of negative channeling will 
produce type 2 violence.  The existence of negative channeling in type C 
repression will fail to preempt violence against the community, but the existence 
of selective coercion will result in fewer gangs and therefore less competition.  
This means that although there will be violence against the community, there will 
also be less violence between gangs because of reduced gang competition.  
E. THE FOURTH HYPOTHESIS—WORST CASE 
Just as the first hypothesis described the best case for preventing the 
existence of the gang cycle and eliminating gang violence, the fourth hypothesis 
represents the worst case and the highest level of gang violence in a given 
community.  Following the gang cycle, type D repression characterized by both 
negative channeling and indiscriminate repression leads to more and larger 
street gangs through increased gang mobilization.  As more and larger street 
gangs develop, the sense of isolation rises as strategic framing creates high 





competition for gang resources like weapons, drug markets, and social status.  
As competition increases, gang violence continually rises through frequent 
internal and external gang violence.   
The combination of negative channeling and indiscriminate repression 
produces the greatest amount of gang mobilization.  By using indiscriminate 
coercion, the state increases the number of grievances in a gang-influenced 
community by making the people feel equally vulnerable to coercion.  When the 
state uses indiscriminate repression, members of the community expect to 
experience coercion, usually in the form of police harassment, regardless of their 
behavior.  This leads the coerced community to resent all examples of 
government coercion and perceives all interactions with authority as illegitimate.  
When this happens, the community starts to think of everyone outside of the 
community as “outsiders” and the feeling of isolation develops. 
Additionally, the existence of negative coercion furthers the feeling of 
isolation within a gang-influenced community as people cannot effectively protest 
or voice their grievances.  By perceiving all ‘outsiders’ and the government as 
both illegitimate and unwilling to help, the community becomes increasingly 
uncooperative and hostile to any input from the government. 
As type D repression increases the feeling of isolation from the broad 
community, incentives for street gang mobilization are greatly increased. By 
providing security, camaraderie, and the potential for economic prosperity, the 
government cannot provide social incentives that compete with gang 
membership.  In many situations, the question is not ‘why join a gang’ but rather 
‘why not?’  Likewise, when a community experiences type D repression, the state 
also loses the ability to provide moral incentives for avoiding gang membership.  
As a matter of hypocrisy, telling members of a community that experiencing 
government-lead violence to avoid gang violence does not make a compelling 
argument.  Finally, the isolation produced by type D repression also eliminates 
the ability of the state to compete with street gangs using public goods 
incentives.  When this happens, any social incentives offered by ‘outsiders’ are 
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perceived as illegitimate as the use of indiscriminate coercion.  As the community 
becomes less connected to the outside world, the collective identity offered by 
street gangs becomes more and more appealing. 
In terms of collective identity, the isolation produced by type 4 repression 
provides a highly hospitable environment for gangs to build solidarity through 
strategic framing.  To achieve this strong sense of identity, there are five types of 
strategic framing.  To begin with, identity frames are those that distinguish 
members of the organization from the rest of the world by defining “who we are 
and who they are.”  For example, as “a group of people that form an allegiance 
based on various social needs,”26 street gangs are “characterized by turf 
concerns, symbols, special dress, and colors.”27  As an indication of the power of 
the gang identity frame, gangs tend to organized themselves along ethnic, racial 
and socio-economic lines that provide members with a shared sense of racial 
inequality or socio-economic hardship, making the culture identity of gang 
membership stronger than that of large families.   
Secondly, diagnostic frames provide the organization with a shared 
understanding of “what the problem is and who is to blame.”28  In the case of 
street gangs, the previous examples of state repression, discrimination, and 
limited economic potential in certain communities have framed the problem 
largely toward police as the visible representative of government repression.  
Therefore, the “public outrage” from unjust repression previously described by 
Martin and Hess has resulted in framing of the police, all levels of “legitimate 
government,” and the members of the broad community as the problematic 
source in gang influenced communities.   
                                            
26 Rick Landre, Mike Miller, and Dee Porter, Gangs: A Handbook for Community Awareness, 
(New York: Facts on File, Inc, 1997), 23. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Doowan Lee, Class Notes, Social Movement Theory, Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 19, 2009. 
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Following the development of diagnostic frames to help blame the source 
of the problem, prognostic frames translate the problem into action.  By outlining 
the organization’s goals as a potential solution,29 diagnostic frames bring a sense 
of purpose to an organization.  This will encourage more people to join the 
movement as the ideology of the movement indicates the potential for change 
rather than continued suffering and “Lip Service.”30 As indicated by Manwaring’s 
definition of third generation gang, the pursuit of “commercial and political 
objectives” aimed at creating “political power in poorly-governed space” 
accurately describes the prognostic frames of many street gangs.  Therefore, 
instead of trying to reenter the broad community, street gangs instead have 
embraced their social and economic isolation and elected to “renovate our [their] 
own interior world.”31 
Once organizations build prognostic frames that promise desired solutions 
to the problem in the future, the next step is to keep the movement from decaying 
over time.  To solve this problem, organizations develop maintenance frames 
that remind members “why it [the movement] cannot fail” and prescribe “how to 
keep it [the movement] going.”32  Considering the tendency for movements to 
degenerate over time due to generational changes, maintenance frames are 
especially essential in continuing a movement beyond the lifespan of its original 
members.  In the example of street gangs, those originating in the 1960s would 
have started to die out as the original members become too old and incapable of 
maintaining a lifestyle centered on violence.  However, continued recruitment of 
gang members across multiple generations has not been a problem.  In fact, 
multigenerational gang membership within families, continued economic disparity 
                                            
29 Doowan Lee, Class Notes, Social Movement Theory, Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 19, 2009. 
30 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological 
Review 51:4(1986), 465. 
31 The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 60. 
32 Doowan Lee, Class Notes, Social Movement Theory, Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 19, 2009. 
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in low income neighborhoods, and continued observation of visible state 
repression have all functioned as maintenance frames in legitimizing gang 
culture.  In fact, recent situations involving members of the National Football 
League (NFL) demonstrate the strength of gang ties on gang members.  For 
example, in 2007 Denver Bronco’s cornerback, Darrent Williams, was murdered 
while participating in a gang-related incident, while other NFL players have been 
fined for “flashing the hand signals of street gangs.”33  
Finally, motivational frames provide members and potential members of 
an organization with an understanding of “why one is obligated to participate [in 
the organization] despite potential personal cost and sacrifice.”34 Motivational 
frames for street gang members come in multiple forms.  For example, 
interfamily framing of the importance of gang membership serves as a 
compelling frame for members of multigenerational gang families.  Likewise, the 
feelings of vulnerability and isolation experienced in areas with high levels of 
gang violence also serves as a motivational frame for many youths to join gangs 
in search of protection and camaraderie. 
As the effects of type D repression follow the gang cycle through 
increased gang formation and collective identity, the final variable that produces 
type 4 violence is resource competition.  As more and larger gangs fill the void 
left by a repressive government, street gangs must compete with each other for 
all available resources.  For first generation gangs, resource competition was 
limited to territory and reputation.  However, second and third generation gangs 
compete for much greater resources.  As organizations “with ambitious political 
and economic agendas,”35 second and third generations gangs must also  
 
                                            
33 Sam Farmer, “NFL is Looking At All the Signs,” latimes.com, 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-nflsigns16-2008jul16,0,1332501.story, (accessed November 
19, 2009). 
34 Doowan Lee, Class Notes, Social Movement Theory, Naval Postgraduate School, 
November 19, 2009. 
35 Anand, “Impact of Technology on the Conduct of Warfare,” Strategic Analysis Journal 23, 
no. 1(1999), http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_99anv02.html, (accessed July 29, 2009). 
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compete for political power as well as market share in an illegal economy.  As the 
competition for resources intensifies, street gangs must resort to varying levels of 
violence to survive. 
Out of resource-competition grows the worst case of gang violence.  Type 
4 violence, characterized by both internal and external violence becomes either 
“backfire” or gang warfare.  As a function of internal violence, gang warfare 
represents the violent extreme of resource competition that has evolved over 
several decades of modification and improvement.  As an example, the Hells 
Angels’ use of warfare against other gangs has evolved to the point where they 
not only employ direct physical violence against competing gangs, but they also 
use acts of terrorism, as well as proxy organizations to defeat their enemies.36  
According to various news sources, Hells Angels members use explosives 
against police and other motorcycle gangs.37  Additionally, due to the high status 
and notoriety of the Hells Angels, they delegate many criminal activities to 
smaller supporting motorcycle gangs that serve as part of the Hells Angels 
criminal empire. 
Along with inter-gang warfare, type D repression also leads to external 
violence directed against the broad community.  According to Hess and Martin, 
the “public reaction of outrage to an event that is publicized and perceived as 
unjust” is called ‘backfire.’38 Just as with the Rodney King incident of 1991, 
backfire can spiral into violence directed against not only the government, but 
against those that are perceived as agents and supporters of the government.  
As organized members of an isolated community, street gangs have the potential 
for committing external violence both as a function of backfire against the 
‘outside’ community or government, but also as an attempt at gaining additional 
financial resources to further gang competition.  As an example, street gangs 
                                            
36 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3. 
37 Hells Angels Activities, http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Hells_Angels_-
_Activities/id/5120318, (accessed July 29, 2009). 
38 David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative 
Events,” Mobilization 11(2006), 249. 
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might resort to armed robbery of non-community members as a way to gain 
money and to express resentment toward members of the ‘outside’ world.   
F. CONCLUSION 
Due to the production of type 4 violence, the fourth hypothesis remains the 
worst case for gang violence as indicated by the gang cycle.  By resorting to type 
4 repression, governments very often contribute to the problems that they had 
intended to stop.  By following the gang cycle, type 4 repression contributes to 
more and larger street gangs, increased collective identity and increased 
competition for resources.  Each of these intervening variables reinforces the 
others to create not only high levels of violence between competing gangs, but 
also to inspire backfire and violence against the ‘outside’ community.  As an 
example of how the type of repression perceived by a community leads to 
violence, the city of Salinas, California demonstrates how a government’s 
decision to change repression type has only lead to increased violence. 
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V. CASE STUDY—SALINAS, CALIFORNIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The city of Salinas, California is an agriculturally based town located in 
central California in Monterey County approximately 15 miles East of the city of 
Monterey and approximately 106 miles South of San Francisco.  Salinas has the 
highest population in Monterey County and serves as the county seat.  The 2009 
population of Salinas is 152,597 and composed of 70 percent Hispanics, 18 
percent White, 2 percent Asian, 1 percent African American, and 9 percent 
other.39 As late as 2007, 16 percent of the population was reported to be in 
poverty with 22 percent of children under 18 living below poverty level.40 
The gang problem in the city of Salinas results from the intense conflict 
between two competing Hispanic gangs, the Nortenos and the Surenos.  As 
stated in the 2009 Salinas Gang Assessment: 
The formation of the Nuestra Familia prison gang in the mid‐1960s 
at nearby Salinas Valley State Prison is a strong historical influence 
on the present gang problems experienced by the City of Salinas 
and Monterey County. In the early 1970s, Norteno street gangs 
became the dominant gang within the Salinas community. By the 
late 1970s, groups of migrant males often victimized by the 
Nortenos formed the earliest Sureno gang in Salinas, the Madeira 
Barrio Locos. Throughout the years, Surenos were continually 
targeted by the Nortenos who were larger in numbers, better 
organized, and are violent. However, in more recent years, the 
Sureno presence in Salinas has increased, fueling the long 
standing rivalry between the two gangs.41 
 
                                            
39 “Gang Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” California Department of Justice, 
(September 2009), 3. 
40 Ibid., 5. 
41 Ibid., 8. 
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The conflict between these two rival gangs has resulted in continued “spiraling 
retaliatory-based violence.”42  According to the Gang Assessment, “In 2007, 
Salinas homicides increased by 100 percent from the previous year from seven 
to fourteen. The following year, another 80 percent increase in homicides 
occurred with 25 homicides, 23 of which were gang‐related. As of September 10, 
2009, there have been 22 homicides in Salinas, all gang‐related.”43 The 
application of the previously described typologies of repression and violence to 
the gang cycle will better explain the causes of violence in Salinas, California.  
Although these levels of gang violence are extreme, the specific examples 
of channeling and repression present in the city of Salinas demonstrates the 
severity of the fourth hypothesis.  By producing a cultural and social environment 
in Salinas, characterized by the combination of indiscriminate repression and 
negative channeling, the type D repression experienced by the minority residents 
of East Salinas has contributed to increased gang mobilization and increased 
gang competition.  Furthermore, this combination of inputs to the gang cycle has 
created the necessary conditions for high levels of both internal and external 
gang violence. 
B. COERCIVE REPRESSION 
To understand the cause of violence in Salinas, according to the gang 
cycle, first requires understanding the degree and type of repression experienced 
by members of the gang-infected community.  The data presented in the 
following paragraphs clearly demonstrate several examples of indiscriminant 
repression used against certain members of the Salinas population. Examples of 
indiscriminate repression exist in the under-representation of Hispanic authority 
figures in the city, as well as with the disproportional arrest rates experienced by 
residents of East Salinas.   
                                            
42 “Gang Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 1. 
43 Ibid.  The Salinas Gang Threat Assessment indicates that the perpetrators of the murders 
in 2007 are attributed to gang violence. 
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The first example of indiscriminate repression found in Salinas concerns 
the under-represented Hispanic community of East Salinas.  Not only are the 
residents of East Salinas poorly represented in local government, but they are 
also poorly represented in law enforcement.  To begin with, although the city of 
Salinas is 70 percent Hispanic, only a very small percentage of the political 
decision makers is Hispanic.  As an example, between the Mayor, Chief of 
Police, and six elected city council members, only one of eight prominent 
government representatives is Hispanic.  This means that only 12.5 percent of 
the Salinas government is of the same ethnicity as 70 percent of the Salinas 
population. For members of Salinas’ majority Hispanic community, such under-
representation in local government contributes directly to the sense of isolation.  
If very few of the authority figures present in the city are fellow Hispanics, then 
there is little cause for this community to feel welcomed or encouraged to 
participate in society outside the invisible confines of the lowest socio-economic 
barriers. 
Worse than under-representation in local government, the residents of 
East Salinas are under-represented by law enforcement.  For example, as the 
most visible representatives of the government, of the Salinas Police 
Department’s (SPD) consists of 189 sworn officers.  Of the total, fewer than 25 
percent are Hispanic and only 25 percent speak Spanish.  In contrast, of the 
106,817 Hispanic residents of Salinas, 38 percent were born outside the United 
States, 90 percent speak Spanish and a full 58 percent report not speaking 
English.44 This means that not only are the residents of Salinas racially isolated 
from the broad community, the uniformed authority figures who most directly 
represent the government control are not capable of communicating with this 
isolated community.  By living in a community where neither Hispanic culture nor 
the capacity for effective communication is adequate, the relationship between 
the SPD and the population is difficult to maintain. 
                                            
44 “Gang Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 4. 
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However, to make matters worse for the under-represented Hispanics in 
Salinas’s government, the actions of the SPD have further isolated the 
community.  In fact, the history of exceedingly high arrest rates for Hispanics in 
the already under-represented community describe acts of coercion as the visible 
trends observed by the SPD arrest records further paint a picture consistent with 
indiscriminant repression.  According to SPD arrest records, although only 70 
percent of the population, Hispanics comprise a full 86 percent of the total 
number of arrests made in Salinas.45  To some, a 16 percent increase in 
Hispanic arrests above the overall population may not indicate indiscriminate 
coercion, but the rates for violent crimes tell another story.  Of the 189 violent 
crimes reported in 2009, 100 percent of the arrests are against Hispanics.46  This 
trend, along with a history of poverty and isolation, has created the perception 
among the poorest Salinas Hispanic communities of indiscriminate use of 
coercive repression. 
The result of indiscriminate repression for the members of Salinas’ 
Hispanic community is almost complete isolation.  With only very few Hispanic 
representatives in local government and increasing frustration with a police force 
they cannot adequately communicate with, it is not surprising that many Salinas 
residents avoid interaction with the broad community altogether.  Not to mention, 
when Hispanic residents do encounter SPD officers, the result is rarely positive.  
High arrest rates, especially for crimes involving violence, have made life difficult 
for many Hispanic residents.  For many, the actions of the police commonly 
equate to harassment and coercion.  This has created a climate within the most 
gang-infested areas of Salinas where police presence is perceived at best as 
coercive and more often than not as illegitimate. 
                                            




C. NEGATIVE CHANNELING 
In addition to the indiscriminate repression observed by the Hispanic 
residents of the City of Salinas, the typology of type D repression also exists in 
the population’s frequent observation of negative channeling.  For members of 
the East Salinas population, both gang and non-gang members of the community 
equally observe negative channeling through large discrepancies in funding for 
federal, state and local law enforcement when compared to other programs 
designed to educate, assist, or mentor those 16–22 year-old youths most 
affected by gang violence.   
One source of fiscal inequality found in Salinas is in local laws like 
‘Measure V.’ This measure passed with 61.74 percent of voter support on 
November 8, 2005, resulting in a half-percent sales tax increase designed to fund 
“police, fire, street and park maintenance services.”47 ‘Measure V’ also 
authorized the creation of an “independent committee with authority to both 
recommend the use of the tax revenue and provide oversight as to the use of the 
funds.”48  According to the City of Salinas, ‘Measure V’ is a “general tax” 
meaning that the “City may use the revenue from the tax for any general 
governmental purpose, including without limitation police, fire safety, paramedics, 
libraries, crossing guards, graffiti removal, anti-gang programs, and street and 
park maintenance.”49 
Although ‘Measure V’ provides possibilities for positive channeling in the 
East Salinas community, the approved appropriations for these funds actually 
results in negative channeling, as observed in the following financial breakdown 
of ‘Measure V’ funds for fiscal year 2006–2007: 
 
 
                                            
47 “Measure V,” http://www.ci.salinas.ca.us/residents/pdf/MeasureVHistory.pdf, (accessed 
January 29, 2010). 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 
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Administration      $295,000.00 
Development & Engineering & Permit Services  $595,000.00 
Finance      $185,600.00  
Fire       $332,500.00  
Legal       $181,900.00  
Library       $3,600,000.00  
Maintenance Services     $834,100.00  
Parks and Recreation     $1,145,900.00  
Police       $2,830,000.00  
Total       $10,000,000.00 50 
According to the following chart, the percentages of each of the above funding 
appropriations for ‘Measure V’ illustrate how funding is disproportionally allocated 
to the Salinas Public Library and the Salinas Police Department:   
 
Figure 4.   Salinas Crime Data 2005–200751 
Furthermore, Figure 4 reveals that none of the ‘Measure V’ money funded 
a single “anti-gang program” as indicated by the City of Salinas.  Although there 
is little doubt that a modern library can serve as a beacon for youth education, 
there is little to suggest that this 36 percent of the ‘Measure V’ funds constitutes 
an “anti-gang program.”52  
Additionally, Figure 4 reveals that a full 28 percent of ‘Measure V’ funded 
the SPD.  For the average member of Salinas’ gang influenced community, 
                                            
50 “Measure V.” 
51 Data is converted from dollars to percentages from the above source. 
52 “Measure V.” 
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‘Measure V’ does nothing more than take more money out of resident’s pockets 
in order to provide $2.83 million to the very source of the community’s 
indiscriminate coercion.  As an example, of the funds designated for law 
enforcement, ‘Measure V’ will provide an additional seven police vehicles and 
eleven police officers.53  
Therefore, not only has excessive coercion by the SPD and the broad 
community increased violence in Salinas, but the city’s use of negative 
channeling has also increased the size of the problem.  Although potentially 
designed to promote positive channeling, ‘Measure V’ in Salinas has instead 
created a dismal situation where members of the repressed community must 
suffer higher taxes to fund the very source of their repression.  By channeling 
money from East Salinas’ taxpayers to the Salinas Police Department and GTF, 
‘Measure V’ only typifies the existence of indiscriminate coercion and negative 
repression characterized by type 4 repression.    
In addition to ‘Measure V,’ the City of Salinas has most recently proposed 
another tax raise designed to fund the Salinas Police Department.  ‘Measure K,’ 
recently proposed in October—November 2009, “failed at the polls… garnering 
less than 40 percent of the vote.”54 If ‘Measure K’ had passed, the City of Salinas 
“would generate $18 million a year and eventually fund Police Chief Louis 
Fetherolf’s wish list for 84 more cops.”55  Although supporters of the plan mourn 
the potential loss of seven Salinas Police officers, the poor turnout at the polls 
serves as a potential indicator of the community’s negative perception of 
‘Measure V.’ However, the political climate surrounding Salinas has made the 
prospect for dramatic changes to police funding extremely difficult to change. 
                                            
53 “Measure V.” 
54 Zachary Stahl, “’Measure K’ Fails, Leaders Look Ahead to Another Measure,” Monterey 
County Weekly, October 29-November 4, 2009, 18. 
55 Zachary Stahl, “‘Measure K’ supporters mourn loss of police-funding plan,” Monterey 
County Weekly, November 5, 2009.  
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When the City of Salinas petitioned for state and federal funding in 2005, 
Mayor Anna Caballero worked closely with state and federal legislators for the 
required additional funding and authorization.  Likewise, Mayor Caballero was 
also serving when ‘Measure V’ became effective.  However, in 2006 Mayor 
Dennis Donohue replaced Caballero when she became a California 
Assemblywoman, continuing to represent the City of Salinas at the state level.  
With Caballero remaining in the political picture, it remains difficult for Mayor 
Donahue to push for new anti-gang measures until the end of ‘Measure V’s’ ten-
year sunset period.  Despite the political challenges, the City of Salinas under 
Mayor Donahue hired a new police chief on April 6, 2009 with hopes that new 
leadership and a new approach can finally reduce the continued high levels of 
gang violence in Salinas.    
In addition to financial negative channeling by the City of Salinas, 
members of this gang-influenced community also experience negative 
channeling through the prison system.  Ironically, the negative channeling 
associated with prison is also the direct result of the indiscriminate repression in 
Salinas characterized by the actions of the SPD.  According to the Salinas Gang 
Threat Assessment for 2009, “the close proximity of two state prisons to the city” 
is listed as the first of eleven key factors contributing to the current level of gang 
violence.56  What makes prison proximity such an issue for the City of Salinas is 
the high rate of “incarcerated gangsters directing gangster activities outside of 
the prisons.”57  Instead of deterring gang violence, the state prison system has 
become a source of negative channeling.   
The negative channeling represented by Salinas’ proximity to state prisons 
is the systematic failure of these prisons to provide rehabilitative services to 
promote education, stimulate employment, and therefore reduce recidivism.  
According to the Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) ‘Quadrennial and Warden 
                                            
56 “Gang Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” California Department of Justice, 
(September 2009), 8. 
57 Ibid. 
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Audit’ conducted by State Inspector General David Shaw in October 2008, SVSP 
Warden Michael Evans failed to properly support education and work programs 
for inmates.  The first official finding of this report states, “Salinas Valley State 
Prison does not appropriately place inmates in work and education assignments, 
resulting in ill-prepared parolees and prolonged periods of costly incarceration.”58  
Likewise, Shaw’s report also describes the importance of these work and 
education programs to the overall prison system.  According to the 2008 report’s 
executive summary, “Improving inmates’ access to educational and vocational 
programs may reduce recidivism and save state funds.”59  Therefore, by denying 
SVSP inmates access to the programs most suited to reducing the problems with 
gang violence in Salinas, Warden Evans has further channeled valuable 
opportunities away from incarcerated Salinas’s residents.  In fact, the SVSP 
report further states “SVSP assigned other inmates to available work or 
education slots, such as inmates sentenced to life terms or inmates convicted of 
violent felonies, both of which are ineligible to receive day-for-day credit.”60  
According to the report, unqualified inmates worked in 32 of 41 work and 
educational assignments (78 percent).61  The results of this failure denies 
“opportunities to inmates who are most likely to be paroled,” while also 
“exacerbates[ing] its [SVSP] overcrowding problem and wastes[ing] tax dollars by 
prolonging the inmates’ periods of incarceration.”62 
As indicated by the SVSP report, prison recidivism also plays a large part 
of the negative channeling associated with the California system of corrections.  
According to the Office of the Governor, “California’s recidivism rate is, at 70 
                                            
58 “Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) Quadrennial and Warden Audit,” Bureau of Audits 
and Investigations, Office of the Inspector General, (October 2008), 13. 
59 Ibid., 2. 
60 Ibid., 13. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. 
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percent, the nation’s highest.”63 The Governor claims that this is the result of the 
state’s poor reentry procedures for released inmates as “Currently, prisoners 
receive almost no preparation for release, increasing the likelihood that they will 
violate parole, commit crimes, and create more victims.”64  
By denying incarcerated gang members opportunities for education, the 
ability to gain post-prison employment, and keeping inmates incarcerated for 
longer periods of time, the prison system near Salinas functions as a positive 
feedback loop. As a complete system, Salinas’s high rates of indiscriminate 
coercion by law enforcement personnel combined with few education and 
employment opportunities, and the nation’s highest recidivism rates, have 
produced positive feedback into the system that exacerbates problems with both 
indiscriminate repression and negative channeling as part of type 4 repression.  
Instead of reducing the problem, the prison system has instead created a vicious 
cycle where the system used to deter and punish gang activity has become a 
large part of the system that causes it.  By keeping prisoners locked up longer, 
street gangs are afforded greater opportunities for using prognostic frames that 
further drive incarcerated gang members toward pursuing a criminally violent 
lifestyle.   
The impact of type D repression on the gang-infected community of East 
Salinas provides several unwanted inputs into the gang cycle.  In accordance 
with the predictions previously described in hypothesis four, the indiscriminate 
repression and negative channeling observed in Salinas contributes not only to 
the sense of isolation from those outside the larger community, but they also help 
frame the actions of the SPD as illegitimate and corrupt.  In turn, street gangs 
acquire stronger moral incentives for gang membership as a vehicle for providing 
protection from the outside world and a seemingly more legitimate social 
structure.    
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The perceived benefits of gang membership in Salinas have not only 
outweighed or eliminated the costs, but they have also drastically elevated the 
collective identity of gang membership.  The result of this increase in collective 
identity has produced two prominent street gangs whose sole identity lies in 
Norteno or Sureno membership.  With all emotional, financial, and pragmatic 
connections to the outside world severed, street gangs are free to creatively 
inject strategic framing back into the isolated population.  Therefore, as gang 
membership soars in Salinas, competition for territory, prestige, respect, and 
financial gain between the two street gang superpowers continuously rises.  Not 
only does severe inter-gang competition further internal violence, such 
competition also provides incentives for gang members to take directly from the 
local community. 
D. VIOLENCE IN SALINAS 
According to hypothesis four, a high level of indiscriminate repression, 
coupled with negative channeling, contributes to the worst-case scenario for 
gang violence.  As demonstrated thus far, the repression in Salinas is exactly 
characteristic of the type D repression described in hypothesis four.  Therefore, 
to evaluate hypothesis four properly requires understanding the typology of 
violence observed in Salinas.  As shown in the following Salinas crime trends, 
two competing gangs in Salinas have contributed to high level of both internal 
and external gang violence.  However, the crime date will also demonstrate how 
specific changes to the SPD have backfired.  Aggressive attempts to ‘crack 
down’ on gang violence in 2005 has only succeeded in transitioning Salinas from 
type C to type D repression resulting in increasing type 4 violence. 
To begin with, the nature of being home to two competing gangs has 
made Salinas no stranger to internal gang violence.  According to the Salinas 
Gang Assessment, the competing gangs in Salinas are “predominant 
contributors to illicit drug and violence problems,” which “consists of, but is not 
limited to, auto theft, burglary, check fraud, identity theft, homicide, narcotic 
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sales, and robbery.”65 Furthermore, additional economic factors related to drug 
sales also contribute to inter-gang violence.  To account for the high degree of 
internal violence between rival gangs, both Nortenos and Surenos “acquire 
narcotics from [the same] Sinaloan cartel suppliers.”66 This means that the gangs 
share a high degree of direct competition for control of drug profits and market 
share that lends itself to internal violence.  As the two rival gangs commit acts of 
violence inside of their isolated community, the nature of the “drug business 
rivalry” has contributed a viscous cycle of “greater spiraling retaliatory-based 
violence.”67 Therefore, each act of violence on either side contributes to 
continued retaliation regardless of the current level of market competition. 
In addition to frequent and intense internal violence, the two gangs of 
Salinas also commit acts of external gang violence. Armed robberies by gang 
members, as well as violence directed against the community to prohibit 
cooperation with the SPD primarily accounts for the high degree of external 
violence conducted within the community.  This means the strong majority of 
violence in Salinas is gang related with only a small percentage falling outside 
gang involvement.  For example, there were 25 homicides in Salinas in 2008, of 
which 23 were gang related.68  As of September 2009, there are already 22 
homicides, 100 percent being gang related.69  This means that violence, outside 
of the realm of street gangs, is almost non-existent in Salinas.  Therefore, 
analysis of the overall violent crime statistics for the city of Salinas almost 
translates directly to analysis of gang violence.    
As illustrated in Figure 5, violent crime is composed of four categories: 
murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  Figure 5 shows the specific 
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crime data for Salinas, California for the years 2003–2008.70 Of the four  
categories of violent crime, murder is indicative of internal gang violence while 
rape, robbery and aggravated assault are indicators of external gang 
violence:
 
Figure 5.   Violent Crimes in Salinas             
As shown by the graph, the indicators of external gang violence 
(aggravated assault and robbery) are in decline, while the indicators of intenal 
gang violence (murder) have remained stable.  These conflicting trends indicate 
that gang violence in the city of Salinas is slowly shifting from type 4 violence 
(high internal gang violence and high external gang violence) to type 3 violence 
(high internal gang violence and low external gang violence).  Normally, this 
trend would indicate that repression in Salinas has transisitioned from type D 
(negative channeling and indiscriminant repression) to type C (negative  
 
                                            
70 All crime data is from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cius.  Data for each year is available in Section 11, Table 8. 
(accessed November 22, 2009). 
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channeling and selective repression).  If so, then the transition from type 4 
violence to type 3 violence is an indicator that community outrage and backfire is 
on the decline. 
However, when observed more closely, the data in figure 5 also shows 
that  aggravated assault and robbery were on the decline until 2005.  At that 
point, the trends have reversed themselves and are currently rising.  This means 
that prior to 2005, Salinas was experiencing type C repression and something 
changed in 2005 that ignited a change from type C (selective coersion) to type D 
(indiscriminant coersion).   As it turns out, the year 2005 ushered in significant 
changes to Salinas’ law enforcement that has come to symbolize excessive 
coersion and repression in Salinas’ gang inflicted areas.  According to hypothesis 
four, more type D repression only serves to increase levels of violence, not the 
other way around.  The following graph shows the trends of the Salinas crime 
data in the three years prior to 2005: 
Figure 6.   Salinas Crime Data 2003-2005 
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In 2004, gang related criminal activity in Salinas, despite the declining 
trend, remained well above the national average for several years.  To gain an 
edge against gang violence, the city of Salinas petitioned Senator Barbara Boxer 
and Congressman Sam Farr for additional funding to start a specialized law 
enforcement unit focused on reducing gang violence.  In March 2005, the City of 
Salinas received the requested funding and authorized the formation of the 
Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force (GTF).71   
To form the GTF, members of several law enforcement organizations 
across Monterey County transferred to the new organization. The broad 
spectrum of law enforcement personnel would allow the GTF to eliminate many 
local jurisdictional issues that street gangs in Salinas have used to shield 
themselves against legal prosecution.  After only two weeks of training, the GTF 
“hit the streets” in April of 2005 with the mission “to effectively combat gang 
violence and gang associated problems.”72  Despite its best efforts, the GTF has 
not been able to accomplish its primary goal of “reduce[ing] the occurrence of 
gang related crimes.”73 Unfortunately, gang violence in the city of Salinas and 
Monterey County spiked to a record high point in 2007, and it continues to 
remain well above the national average.74  The following chart shows the trends 





                                            
71 “Monterey County Joint gang Task Force – Home Page,”  
http://www.gangtaskforce.org/home.htm  (accessed November 22, 2009). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid.  
74 “Salinas, California (CA) Detailed Profile - Relocation, Real Estate, Travel, Jobs, 
Hospitals, Schools, Crime, Move, Moving, Houses News, Sex Offenders,” http://www.city-
data.com/city/Salinas-California.html (accessed November 22, 2009). 
 36
 
Figure 7.   Salinas Crime Data 2005–2007 
However, despite the allocation of state and federal funding designed to 
reduce gang violence, there is little evidence to show that the existence of the 
GTF has reduced the perception of indiscriminate coercion for members of 
Salinas’ gang influenced communities.  In fact, according to Salinas Police Chief 
Louis Fetherolf, “So much of the community views us as an occupying force 
rather than an integrated fabric.”75 Therefore, even after witnessing a murder, 
members of the community frequently resist cooperating with Salinas Police.  As 
one reporter noted, “witnesses in a position to see everything share nothing with 
police.  Their silence is so absolute that after a killing in August [2009], a 
department spokesperson told the local paper that police were ‘absolutely 
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begging’ for witnesses.”76 The poor relationship between the community and the 
police echoes in the words of one father of a gang murder victim in 2008: “Lots of 
people are afraid of the cops.”77   
Unfortunately, members of the GTF and the SPD have failed to accept or 
understand the effects of indiscriminate repression on the residents of Salinas.  
However, reports indicate that both SPD and GTF leaders admit that the results 
of the GTF have not been what they anticipated.  According to reports as recent 
as February 2010, SPD and GTF leaders “acknowledged…that a reversal of the 
upward trend in violent crime is still not in sight.”78 Because of the aggressive 
and productive nature of the GTF, the failure to reduce crime has left leaders 
frustrated.  Although since its stand-up, the GTF has made a total of more than 
“2,800 arrests; 5,000 probation and parole searches; and 21,000 traffic and 
pedestrian stops,” Police Chief Fetherolf considers the continued upward trend in 
violent crime a “sign of the times.”79 Instead of taking the crime trends as an 
indication of failure or poor performance on the part of the GTF, law enforcement 
leaders blame the insurgent nature of street gangs.  According to Sherriff Mike 
Kanalakis, “This [the GTF report] is not a report card, but rather a barometer of 
criminal street gang activity.”80 Likewise, District Attorney Dean Flippo added 
“There really is an insurgency out there by a small group of individuals who are in 
gangs and determined to commit as much violence as they can.”81 The 
unfortunate consequence of these kinds of statements from law enforcement 
leaders and city officials is the likelihood that it will only lead to a redoubling of 
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efforts.  Instead of searching for the true cause for the law enforcement failure, 
GTF leaders are likely to continue the failed course of indiscriminate repression 
against the residents of Salinas.  In fact, GTF Commander Bob Eggers states 
that violent crime would have been worse had it not been for the efforts of the 
GTF.82 Furthering the denial of GTF failure, Sherriff Kanalakis remarks on the 
extremely low rate of complaints filed against the GTF.  With only 11 formal 
complaints, Sherriff Kanalkis stated “Over a five year span [that] is remarkably 
low.”83  
However, despite these claims of denial, the GTF report ends up being 
much more telling of the GTF penchant for coercion and repression.  As GTF 
Commander Bob Eggers states: 
The 11 [formal complaints], they’re not the only ones. There were 
plenty of other people that were initially disenchanted with us [the 
GTF] being there. But most never filed a formal complaint. The 
unfortunate by product of having a family member on parole or 
probation is that we are allowed to enter their place of residence to 
conduct a compliance check.  Family members become upset 
because we’re doing that. They don’t understand the legal 
ramifications of having that person living with them, what it 
surrenders them to in terms of us being able to come in and take a 
look.84 
This statement certainly clarifies the perception of police repression from the 
perspective of the gang-influenced community.  As this community becomes 
increasingly isolated from the values and norms of normal society, this  type of 
police activity only increases the perception of the police as illegitimate and 
corrupt.  Not to mention, the family members of parolees or those on probation 
will fail to view their loved ones as criminals.  Instead, the community regards 
parolees as victims of corrupt “invaders” or “outsiders.”  When people believe 
that any member of a repressed community, regardless of individual actions, has 
                                            




an equal chance of receiving punishment, the situation can only be described as 
tyranny. Because of the increased level of indiscriminant repression, the creation 
of the GTF in 2005 marked the transformation from type C repression to type D 
repression that has likewise contributed to the rise of type 4 violence in Salinas.   
In response to the failures of the GTF to reduce gang violence, the city of 
Salinas has recently borrowed from a successful program that has produced 
incredible results in Chicago.  According to the Finn Institute for Public Safety in 
2008, the CeaseFire-Chicago Program’s “theory rests on three factors that 
contribute to violence—norms, decision making, and risks.”85  To counter the norms 
associated with gang violence, CeaseFire-Chicago “provides for community 
mobilization, public education, and mentoring via outreach workers.”86 To change 
decision making associated with gang violence, CeaseFire-Chicago relies on 
“violence interrupters,” not police officers, to “provide immediate alternatives to 
violence at the time when individuals are making decisions about retaliation.”87 
Finally, to address the risks involved in committing acts of violence, members of the 
program produce messages to communicate “a classic deterrence message.”88  
One important aspect of the CeaseFire-Chicago Program is that they do not rely 
on police to reduce the violence.  Instead: 
The outreach workers and violence interrupters are streetwise 
individuals who are familiar with gang life in the communities where 
CeaseFire is active. Many of them are former gang members and 
many have spent time in prison, but they are now ‘on this side of 
the line’ and eager to give back and help young people in their 
neighborhoods.”89  
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Of the Chicago areas studied statistically, “violence was down by one 
measure or another in six of the seven areas.”90 Overall, shootings decreased 
17-24 percent and “persons actually shot or killed” declined 16–34 percent.91  By 
relying on members of the gang infected community instead of police or other 
representatives of repressive authority, the CeaseFire-Chicago Program 
continues to serve as an effective source for violence reduction.  Unfortunately, 
the program adopted by the city of Salinas uses a similar name, but very different 
techniques. 
The Salinas version of the successful Chicago program is much different 
from its namesake.  According to local news sources, the Salinas Ceasefire 
program “aims to reduce gang violence by giving gang members an ultimatum to 
give up their criminal ways or face prosecution and hard time.”92 Those taking 
part in the program receive “employment opportunities and training.”93 In the 
ceasefire Salinas program, the SPD invites known gang members to attend ‘call-
ins.’ At these meetings, the SPD meets with small groups of gang members and 
offers job training opportunities for those willing to participate.  As far as the types 
of jobs offered, Deputy Chief Kelly McMillian states “Remedial jobs don't 
work…[But] we're not looking at $100,000 a year jobs either, [just] one that can 
provide the dignity of good employment."94 The other side of the ultimatum 
offered at the ‘call-ins’ is the threat of enhanced aggressiveness to those who fail 
to commit to the Ceasefire Program. 
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Unfortunately, the Salinas Ceasefire program does not offer the same 
alternative to repression as the program successfully employed in Chicago.  The 
primary difference with the Salinas program is that it relies on the use of cops as 
the intervening tool, while CeaseFire-Chicago uses actual reformed members of 
the community.  This means that gang members are being encouraged to reduce 
violence by a person who shares a similar history and background rather than by 
a visible “agent of repression.”95  By neglecting this step, Salina’s Ceasefire 
program will likely appear to Salinas gang members as another example of police 
repression.  Additionally, the only carrot involved in the Salinas Ceasefire 
program is the promise for job training.  However, in a city with 17 percent 
unemployment, the financial benefit for a gang member to exchange gang life for 
a low-paying job is minimal. Not to mention, any ex-gang member who leaves his 
protective fold is thereby making himself an easy target for retaliation by 
members of rival gangs.  Therefore, promises made by police officers who are 
perceived as ‘illegitimate,’ for jobs that are already perceived as ‘non-existent,’ in 
return for leaving the safety of one gang only to be vulnerable to retaliation by 
another, only shows the extent to which the City of Salinas underestimates the 
effects of repression on violent crime. 
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VI. CASE STUDY—OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The City of Oakland, the eighth largest city in California, is located across 
the bay from San Francisco,96immediately south of the city of Berkeley in 
Alameda County.  Compared to Salinas, Oakland’s population of 400,000 is 
approximately 2.5 times larger,97 with a more diverse racial composition.  
Oakland’s residents are only 21.9 percent Hispanic compared to 70 percent in 
Salinas and consisst of 35.7 percent black, 23.5 percent white, 8 percent 
Chinese and 3.7 percent other. Additionally, compared to Salinas’ strong 
agricultural based economy, Oakland is “a major center of commerce and 
industry…in just 56 square miles of land…known for its thriving economy and 
world-class cultural attractions.”98 However, like Salinas, Oakland is home to a 
prominent gang problem, as well as the “state’s highest homicide rate for cities 
with populations higher than 100,000.”99 
The gang problem in the city of Oakland is also more diverse than in 
Salinas.  Along with the same two competing Hispanic gangs of Salinas, the 
Nortenos and the Surenos, Oakland is also home to various other gangs: 
You have the drug dealing gangs, who are also territorial.  They 
have a certain area where they make their money and they defend 
that with violence.  There are motorcycle clubs like the Hells Angels 
and the East Bay Dragons. And then you have robbery-type gangs, 
people who get together and just rob people randomly.100   
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With such a large gang population, city leaders in Oakland, just as with city 
leaders in Salinas, also passed sweeping anti-gang legislation designed to 
reduce gang violence. 
B. VIOLENCE IN OAKLAND 
In 2004, with a vote of 7 to 1 in the city council and 69.6 percent of the 
popular vote, the City of Oakland Passed ‘Measure Y,’ the Violence Prevention 
and Public Safety Act.  According to the official Berkeley Policy Associates (BPA) 
report on ‘Measure Y’ dated December 12, 2008, “’Measure Y’ increased 
property taxes and parking fees to fund violence prevention programs, police and 
fire services.”101  According to the provisions of ‘Measure Y,’ funds  should  
support certain community-oriented policing programs like “Problem Solving 
Officers…who provide community policing in Oakland neighborhoods,” as well as 
other community programs designed “to prevent teenagers and young adults 
from engaging in criminal activity. Some of these programs are intended to  deter 
youths who have never committed a crime; others focus on individuals who are 
on probation, or who are returning from prison and are at risk of committing 
additional  crimes.”102 Compared with the provisions of ‘Measure V’ in Salinas, 
Oakland’s program at first glance appears to channel public funds away from 
repressive, police focused programs into more local level, community based 
ones.   
According to the official Web site, “The Measure Y network weaves 
together social services, nonprofits, police, employment, schools, criminal justice, 
faith based agencies and community members at the neighborhood level to 
address the symptoms of violence.”103 However, since 2004, Oakland’s violent 
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crime rates, especially for ‘external gang violence’ has risen drastically.  The 
following chart shows Oakland’s crime rates from 2001–2008: 
Figure 8.   Oakland Crime 2001–2008 
As demonstrated by the gang cycle, the typologies of repression and 
violence, and the Salinas case study, the provisions of ‘Measure Y’ in Oakland 
should have drastically reduced external gang violence, whereas the above chart 
shows the exact opposite effect.  Since the implementation of ‘Measure Y,’ 
robbery and aggravated assaults have actually increased 152 percent and 158 
percent, respectively.   
Although ‘Measure Y’ has appropriated “$19 million every year for ten 
years”104 to fund both police and violence prevention programs, “it is possible 
that the Measure Y services were not intensive enough to make a real difference, 
especially for juvenile offenders with a record of serious prior offenses.”105 As an 
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example, the budgetary split for ‘Measure Y’ funds has been 40 percent for 
violence prevention programs and 60 percent for police services.106  This means 
that for every dollar spent on funding the police, only $0.66 is spent on violence 
prevention.  Therefore, as with Salinas, the isolated members of the gang 
infested community observe ‘Measure Y’ as another example type D repression 
consisting of coercive repression and negative channeling. 
C. COERCIVE REPRESSION 
Even though the City of Oakland has spent more ‘Measure Y’ funds on 
programs designated for ‘violence prevention’ when compared to the City of 
Salinas, the Oakland Police Department still maintains a reputation for coercive 
policing.  According to the People United for a Better Life in Oakland (PUEBLO), 
a group dedicated to “advocate[ing] for the needs of low-income residents of 
Oakland, most of them people of color, by grassroots organizing, offering 
leadership training and initiating policy reform,” “police misconduct is a major 
concern.”107 According to PUEBLO,“ In 2008 alone, the Oakland Police 
Department  shot ten civilians, six of whom died. In none of those shootings were 
police charged with crimes or fired for their involvement. In fact, no officer in the 
Oakland Police Department has been charged with criminal activity or fired for 
civilian shootings since 2004.”108  
As a specific example of police brutality, the group cites Captain Edward I. 
Paulson: “the head of the Oakland Police Department’s Internal Affairs 
Department, [who] was suspended following allegations that he viciously beat a 
suspect, who later died, and then demanded that subordinates keep his brutality 
a secret.”109  Following her son’s death, the victim’s mother claimed that she 
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“almost filed suit but was dissuaded from doing so by affirmative and misleading 
statements and conduct by Oakland police."110  This case and the actions of the 
PUEBLO organization provide insight as to how ‘Measure Y’ failed to reduce 
violence in Oakland.111 
In addition to the Paulson Case, the Oakland Police have initiated other 
programs that are likely to have unintended effects on gang violence.  According 
to Oakland Local, City Attorney John Russo plans to file an injunction targeting 
specific gangs and specific areas in Oakland.  Supporters of such measures 
believe that “they make neighborhoods safer by cracking down on gangs and 
crime.”112 According to Alex Kats, spokesperson for the city attorney’s office, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has been consulted to “discuss ways to 
craft the order.”113  Some common restrictions included in similar injunctions 
include “no association with other gang members; no using gang signs or 
wearing gang colors or clothes; no possession of drugs or alcohol; no possession 
of weapons; no graffiti; and no intimidation or harassment.”114  Violators of the 
injunction risk legal charges to include “contempt of court, a criminal  
 
 
                                            
110 Kelly Rayburn, “Judge Clears Way for Case Against Oakland Police To Move Ahead,” 
MercuryNews.com, http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_14465540, (accessed 
February 27, 2010). 
111 According to local reporter, Vic Lee, the Paulson incident from 2000 resulted in the death 
of Jerry Amaro after he was arrested for buying illegal narcotics.  Following 30 days of hospital 
treatment, “Amaro died from pneumonia caused by broken ribs and a collapsed lung.” According 
to the official investigation, “officers on the scene told police internal affairs that Paulson told them 
to lie and say he did not kick Amaro.” (Vic Lee, “FBI Investigates Oakland Police Captain,” 
January 23, 2009, http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=6622235, 
(accessed February 27, 2010.)  Additionally, the Paulson case has made local news headlines 
when U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup “clears[ed] the way for a case the [Amaro] family 
filed in 2009 to move forward after the city wanted it tossed out.” (Kelly Rayburn, “Judge Clears 
Way for Case Against Oakland Police to Move Ahead,” MercuryNews.com, 
http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_14465540, (accessed February 27, 2010.) 
112 Emile Raguso, “Gang Injunction on Oakland’s Horizon,” Oaklandlocal.com, February 5, 
2010, http://oaklandlocal.com/article/gang-injunction-oaklands-horizon, (accessed February 27, 
2010). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid.   
 48
misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in jail and/or a $1,000 fine.” 
However, those opposed to injunctions view them as additional sources of 
repression: 
Activists charge that instead of targeting individuals for their 
criminal activity, gang injunctions sweep entire communities into a 
net of police surveillance. Moreover, they argue, injunctions, for the 
most part, are imposed not on the largest gangs or the most 
notorious gang neighborhoods but rather in areas that are near to 
white neighborhoods or those most attractive for gentrification. At a 
(Los Angeles-area) council hearing on these injunctions held in 
May 2006, community residents from areas under injunction 
complained of severe curtailment of basic freedom and routine 
police harassment.115 
In other words, injunctions in a city already frustrated by cases like 
Captain Paulson are likely to increase frustration in the community.  According to 
Jory Steele, managing attorney for the ACLU, "What they [injunctions] do is make 
everyday activities a crime.  People under them face probation-like restrictions 
without ever (in many cases) having been able to go to court to defend 
themselves." 116 
According to the typology of repression, the actions of the Oakland Police 
Department and the City Attorney’s Office, from the perspective of the isolated 
minority population, are characteristic of type D repression.  This means that the 
community considers the actions of the police or the policy of the city attorney to 
be examples of indiscriminate coercion, while also interpreting the unequal 
distribution of ‘Measure Y’ funds for police programs as examples negative 
channeling.  Therefore, the observations in Oakland support the expected 
outcome of hypothesis 4 where high levels of type D repression provides 
incentives for gang members to strengthen their strategic frames and increase 
their collective identity.  In turn, Oakland gang members have become 
increasingly  isolated and have not only maintained equal levels of internal 
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violence, but they have also expressed their frustration with the broad community 
by increasing their levels of external violence.  As such, the Oakland crime data 
accurately reflects large increases in external crime since the implementation of 
‘Measure Y.’ 
D. NEGATIVE CHANNELING 
In addition to coercive repression, ‘Measure Y’ also contributes to type D 
repression using negative channeling.  Just as with coercion, the existence of 
negative channeling is not immediately obvious.  However, taking a more 
thorough examination of ‘Measure Y’ funding clearly demonstrates how funds are 
channeled primarily to law enforcement programs with only a very small 
percentage expended to support violence prevention.   
As previously stated, the official budgetary split for ‘Measure Y’ funding 
directs 60 percent of the total budget to support police services and 40 percent to 
support violence prevention programs.117  Of a $19 million budget, $11.4 million 
will support law enforcement while $7.6 million is directed to support programs 
designed to “break cycles of violence...focus on serving at-risk youth, victims of 
domestic violence or child abuse, and ex-offenders in need of job skills and 
placements.”118 Although a 40 percent budgetary slice is a significant 
improvement compared to Salinas’ ‘Measure V,’ the realities of the measure 
continue to represent negative channeling. 
The biggest example of negative channeling in ‘Measure Y’ funding is the 
wide array of programs supported by the 40 percent budget slice.  To begin with, 
$4 million off the top is designated to support fire services and the remainder is 
divided over more than 20 programs.  This means that the $7.6 million budget 
actually becomes $3.6 million divided between multiple programs making the 
financial impact to each individual organization very small.  However, the impact 
of the 60 percent slice to support police services tips the balance to the opposite 
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side.  With $11.4 million supporting police services, the most observable impact 
of the budget will occur on the side of police services.  This means that the 
people of Oakland will see new police officers and new police equipment on the 
street much more frequently than they will see any changes to specific social 
programs.   
When such police expansion is coupled with the police department’s 
previously described reputation for coercion, the results demonstrate negative 
channeling.  Therefore, just like Salinas, ‘Measure Y’ becomes another attempt 
at forcing residents of Oakland to support the very source of their repression.  
The subsequent results, also like Salinas, have been higher levels of crime, 
especially examples of external crime that further contributes to type D 
repression and more inputs into the gang cycle. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As indicated by the unfortunate finding of the Oakland BPA report, despite 
the attempts at positive channeling in Measure Y, the end result illustrates that 
the ‘violence prevention policies’ intended for the Oakland population remain “not 
intensive enough” when compared to the examples of indiscriminate coercion 
and negative channeling not addressed by the measure.119 As government 
representatives change, council members are elected to higher positions, and 
police chiefs come and go, members of the isolated community and gang 
members are not fooled by fresh faces.  Instead, the long history of government 
distrust remains forever fresh in their minds. 
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In response to social and political isolation from the broad community, 
street gangs have served as an effective substitution, especially in urban areas.  
As time has passed, not only have street gangs evolved into third generation 
gangs with larger political and criminal agendas, but they have also followed the 
gang cycle often associated with increasing levels of violence.  Adding to the 
original source of repression that initially developed street gangs, governments at 
all levels have wrongly continued to rely on the use of repression as a false 
strategy for combating gang violence.  The common belief about repression is 
that when applied intensely enough, street gang members will eventually bend to 
the will of the state and broad community and abandon violence as an output of 
gang life.  Unfortunately, as evidenced by the case studies of both Salinas and 
Oakland, California, the community and governments misunderstanding of 
repression has only exacerbated the problem. 
As shown in both Salinas and Oakland, more coercive repression from the 
state and community only leads to more violence.  Ironically, the most ineffective 
form of repression also tends to be the most popular.  As indicated by the effect 
of combining coercive repression with negative channeling, the gang cycle and 
high levels of both internal and external gang violence support the validity of the 
fourth hypothesis.  When observing the counter-gang policies in both Salinas and 
Oakland, the lack of understanding is abundantly clear— more repression leads 
to more gang violence.  In the case of Salinas, the local government 
demonstrated a sharp progression toward coercive repression with the 
establishment of the GTF. Likewise, empirical data also demonstrates several 
examples of negative channeling where money is diverted away from community 
programs toward the police as the source of the isolated community’s repression.  
Because of this, internal violence between gangs has remained steady while  
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external violence against the community continues to rise.  Sadly, by increasing 
the level of indiscriminate coercion, the city of Salinas has only made their 
situation worse. 
Similarly, the nearby city of Oakland shares many similarities with Salinas 
concerning the poor understanding of the effects of repression.  By maintaining a 
police force that is widely known for coercive repression and creating laws that 
contribute greatly to negative channeling, the levels of violence in Oakland have 
increased over 150 percent in just six years—not to mention the proposals for 
gang injunctions that are currently pending will effectively prevent parolees from  
legally reintegrating back into the community and criminalize many everyday 
activities.  
B.  BREAKING THE CYCLE 
Many options exist for breaking the gang cycle instead of continuing the 
current system of community isolation and increased repression.  To break this 
cycle requires changing community policing strategies and redirecting negative 
channeling programs to allow the isolated community to integrate slowly with the 
broad community.  Likewise, returning prisoners and former gang members 
require effective local programs to facilitate job opportunities and to provide 
career placement.  With adequate attention to stopping repression and emphasis 
on economic opportunities, new counter-gang strategies will gradually reduce the 
high levels of crime associated with gang violence to create safer and better 
communities. 
As easy as it sounds, breaking the gang cycle requires more than placing 
the counter-gang strategy in the hands of the police.  In fact, for more effective 
counter-gang program, the police department and court system should play a 
much smaller role than in the previously described failing programs.  In fact, 
understanding how the gang cycle contributes to gang violence is the key to 
understanding how to counter it.   
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To begin with, no counter-gang program can succeed without the 
supporting community first recognizing the existence of repression and isolation.  
However, changing the deep-rooted feelings between the isolated and broad 
communities is not easy and has no quick fix.  A great first step for many local 
communities, especially Salinas and Oakland, is to review all policies contributing 
to negative channeling and create more programs for positive channeling.  With 
negative channeling, isolated people join street gangs to feel involved.  However, 
positive channeling through effective outreach programs will encourage people to 
join other organizations, and the benefits to gang membership will dwindle over 
time.  In addition to reviewing current policies, Salinas and Oakland should 
consider adopting examples from organizations specializing in community 
development.  
According to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD), 
outreach programs utilize specially selected individuals “to serve as good role 
models, to identify and connect with the appropriate youth, and…help [people in] 
finding a job or job training, returning to school, controlling their anger, handling 
court appointments or their probation officers, and engaging with their family.” 120 
Outreach workers provide positive channeling to gang influenced youth by 
“spend[ing] time with youth on the street, in their home, and on the phone…to 
connect with the youth and begin to move the youth towards a pro-social 
path.”121 Likewise, successful outreach programs provide the opportunity for 
workers to “focus on long-term relationship building [and] often develop close 
relationships with youth.”122 
Next, police in gang infested communities need to reevaluate who they 
hire and reshape the criteria for being a successful police officer.  To do this 
requires hiring police officers who understand the heavy responsibilities involved 
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in policing and who are motivated to make a difference.  No effective counter-
gang policing strategy should tolerate even the slightest infraction of civil rights 
abuse or corruption.  However, communities and law enforcement organizations 
must realize that the relationship between the local police as the source of 
repression, and the isolated community will not become friendly overnight.  
Rather, extensive and aggressive public relations campaigns will be required to 
advertise the new role of police.  Instead of looking at police as outsiders, efforts 
must be made to incorporate members of the isolated community into the force 
so that people feel honest, caring citizens rather than foreign invaders are 
policing them.   
Additionally, police departments and outreach programs must build a 
cooperative relationship without direct oversight by any law enforcement agency.  
One benefit of a cooperative relationship between outreach workers and law 
enforcement is “police have the most immediate information on violence that 
occurred, such as shootings and killings, and may also have very timely 
information on impending gang conflicts, the identity of individuals the police 
suspected and were looking out for, hot spots, and other information on crime 
and criminals.”123  With this valuable information, outreach workers can better 
“work on conflict mediation and work to prevent retaliation...It is also helpful for 
programs that work with victims of crimes, organize vigils, and try to calm the 
community after such an event.”124 Additionally, law enforcement agencies can 
assist outreach programs with hiring of workers by facilitating background check 
of potential hires and helping to insure that workers do not become involved in 
criminal activity.  When police agencies assist outreach programs instead of 
directing them, residents of gang-affected communities can interact with other 
members of the isolated community instead of police ‘outsiders.’  Also, the strong 
relationship between police and outreach programs provides a unique 
                                            




opportunity for outreach worker ‘insiders’ to showcase the benefits and good 
points of the law enforcement community.  Over time, this relationship will help 
repair and change the perception of police organizations at the street level. 
In addition to law enforcement, effective outreach programs must also 
collaborate with “criminal and juvenile justice agencies, such as probation, 
parole, and corrections” in order to “reach out to youth and adults that may be 
reconsidering their street life and be willing to consider a different path once they 
are released.”125  Failure to ensure employment for parolees is a sure way to 
increase violence and raise recidivism rates further as previously described by 
the poor performance of the SVSP.  Specifically, hard-core gang members and 
gang leaders require special attention and specific incentives if they are to 
abandon gang life after incarceration.  The natural charisma and leadership skills 
possessed by many of these individuals must be transferable to similar roles in 
the legitimate business world.  Like federal programs for returning veterans, local 
governments must develop similar programs to help returning prisoners integrate 
into mainstream society.  It is important to note that these programs must be 
capable of emplacing former gang members into occupational positions where 
they feel empowered or risk incentivizing the return to gang membership and a 
life of crime.   
In addition to the CeaseFire Chicago program, other cities have developed 
successful outreach programs that have been successful in reducing gang 
violence.  One example of a successful program is the Boston Center for Youth 
and Families‘ Streetworker Program (BCYF).  Initiated in 1990 and funded by the 
Boston city government, the BCYF depends on inter-agency coordination with 
departments such as the Boston Police Department, Department of Public 
Health, Boston Public Schools, Municipal Courts, and District Courts to “reduce  
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gang and youth violence” using a comprehensive approach.126  With 25 
streetworkers, most of whom have criminal records and previous gang affiliation, 
the BCYF aims to: 
help youth and families gain access to a wide array of health 
services including education, recreation, enrichment, substance 
abuse treatment, tutoring, food, clothing, and shelter. The 
Streetworker Program aims to encourage drop-out youth to return 
to school and to direct them towards services and programs that 
help them receive an education—either academic or professional 
depending on the clients‘ capacity and needs.127 
 Another example of a successful outreach program is the California Youth 
Outreach (CYO) program in San Jose, California founded in 1981 by a former 
gang member.128  Like the BCYF, CYO outreach workers are “individuals who 
have successfully moved away from the gang lifestyle, bringing first-hand 
knowledge of gang life to their relationships with the youth they serve.”129 CYO 
outreach workers receive extensive training in “case management, gang 
intervention, life skills, conducting presentations, and education of the symptoms 
and effects of drugs and alcohol,” while also learning “how to work with police, 
probation, and schools.”130 Also relying on inter-agency cooperation, the CYO 
aims to reduce gang violence by “provide[ing] mediation and crisis response 
services” for at risk youth on the street.131 Furthermore, the CYO‘s founder 
Pastor Anthony Ortiz was awarded the 2004 California Peace Prize Award, and 
the CYO received the National Gang Crime Research Center‘s 2006 Thrasher 
Award for exemplary gang prevention and intervention programs.132 
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Although expensive and time consuming, the alternative to an effective 
counter-gang strategy is dismal and the status quo of continued repression and 
negative channeling has failed to work.  However, to minimize the funding 
challenges required of successful counter-gang programs, the significant 
excesses of taxpayer spending directed toward supporting heavy-handed 
policing strategies can easily be redesignated to better support the counter-gang 
effort.  By breaking the downward cycle of violence instead of reinforcing it, the 
opportunity for real change and positive results can slowly become a reality.  
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